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“The steam engine, then, we may just look 
upon as the noblest machine invented by 
man – the pride of the machinist, the 
 admiration of the philosopher....” 
 
M.A. Alderson, An Essay on the Nature  
and Application of Steam, 1834     
  
1.   Introduction 
 
Not so long ago most economists, though recognising that technical progress was the key 
determinant of economic growth, preferred to consider it as essentially “exogenous”, or, to 
say it better, as something that was not amenable of a fully satisfactory explanation using the 
conventional economist’s toolkit.  In the words of Joan Robinson, economists regarded 
technical change as something given to us  “by God, scientists and engineers”. With a touch 
of proper modesty, economists decided that understanding the reasons underlying God’s 
behaviour was far outside their reach. Interestingly enough, such a view of technological 
progress regarded in the same way the behaviours of scientists and engineers. These, when 
considered from an economic point of view, were seen merely as  “carriers” of the 
autonomous logic of technological progress.  
 
Since then, a drastic shift of perspective seems to have taken place. The second part of the 
1980s saw the emergence of the “new (neoclassical) growth theory”. Technical progress was 
not only regarded as the driving force of economic growth, but it was claimed that its 
dynamics could  be finally explained using conventional economic analysis. This body of 
literature rapidly established itself as the new orthodoxy with respect to the connection 
between technical change and economic growth.  
 
There is another remarkable difference between the “old” and the “new” version of 
neoclassical growth theory. As was pointed out by Hahn and Matthews, the “old” 
neoclassical growth theory did not pretend to be a theory of economic history (Hahn and 
Matthews, 1964; see also Hahn, 1988). The more circumspect and less ambitious aim of the 
major part of the “old” neoclassical growth models was to illustrate the behaviour of a set of 
critical variables assuming that a number of very restrictive assumptions were satisfied. Of 
course, it was reasonable to hope, that, an improved understanding of the mechanics of 
growth in these imaginary situations, “golden ages”  (using another expression coined by 
Joan Robinson) more likely to belong to some mythical lost world rather than to the actual 
course of history of mankind, could contribute to shed some light on the growth record of 
capitalist economies. However, at least among the most attentive contributors to the 
neoclassical approach as Hahn himself, claims laid in this direction were particularly modest. 
As Hahn and Matthews stated in their survey, it was rather clear that historical patterns of 
economic growth could not be adequately described by means of steady-state growth models 
(Hahn and Matthews, 1964).    
 
  2This seems to have changed in the new growth theory. Not only there is the claim that the 
new models can finally provide an adequate picture of the endogenous process of technical 
change. A number of contributions have also contended that endogenous growth models 
may be applied in a rather straightforward way to the study of concrete episodes of 
economic growth. In particular, this claim seems to characterize a rather recent development 
of the endogenous growth theory, the so called general purpose technologies (GPT) growth 
models (see the essays collected in Helpman, 1998 ). It is worth noting that the concept of 
General Purpose Technology is essentially a ‘domestication’ in the ambit of endogeneous 
growth theory of a number of key-ideas that were originally expounded by authors (Freeman 




In the original formulation proposed by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), GPT are defined 
as technologies endowed with three salient characteristics: a) they perform some general 
function, so they can be employed in a wide range of possible application sectors, b) they 
have a high technological dynamism, so that the efficiency with which they perform their 
function is susceptible of being continuously improved, c) they generate “innovation 
complementarities”, that is to say that their adoption stimulates further rapid technical 
progress in the application sectors. Steam power, electricity and information and 
communication technologies are most frequently put forward as clear-cut examples of 
GPTs. 
 
A particularly interesting aspect of this class of endogenous growth models is that they 
generate patterns of growth that are characterized by episodes of acceleration and 
deceleration determined by the implementation of successive GPTs, producing on a long 
time scale a wave-like profile.  More specifically, these models assume that a new GPT 
requires a rather a long period of “acclimatization”. Hence, the initial impact of GPT on 
productivity growth is typically rather “small”. This phase of sluggish dynamic of 
productivity concludes when the GPT is finally fully “acclimatized” in the economy. Then, 
the rapid rate of technological change in the GPT and in the application sectors (due to the 
innovational complementarities of the GPT) produces an increase in the rate of overall 
productivity growth. Finally, as the scope for further improvements in the GPT is 
progressively exhausted, this phase of rapid productivity growth will gradually peter out. 
 
Borrowing the expression from Harberger (1998), David and Wright (1999) have suggested 
that the progressive penetration of a GPT in the economic system triggers a dynamics of 
productivity growth that is ‘yeast-like’, in the sense that, spurred by the GPT, productivity 
tends to grow at the same, uniform and relatively rapid rate in a wide range of application 
sectors. Vice versa, before the phase of penetration, the dynamics of productivity is instead 
‘mushroom-like’, this means that productivity growth rates tend to be highly idiosyncratic 
without much correlation across industries. In their paper, David and Wright analyse the 
development and diffusion of electricity in this perspective, linking the yeast-like behaviour 
of early twentieth century productivity of US manufacturing with the progressive penetration 
of the “dynamo” in the economy.   In this historical interpretation (see also David (1990)) 
one may indeed recover deep analogies in the diffusion processes of steam power, electricity 
and ICT technologies and explain the relatively slow pace of diffusion common to the 
                                                 
1 For a critique of the neo-Schumpeterian view of economic history, see Bruland and Smith (1999).   
  3emergence of any new GPT. In this view, the rise of what Freeman and Perez (1988) define 
a ‘new techno-economic paradigm’ is deeply affected by a number of ‘retardation factors’. 
The emergence of new GPTs brings together painstaking processes of co-evolution and co-
adaptation of new technologies, new organizational forms, new institutions and new 
consumption patterns. Retardation factors do not concern technologies only, but also, and 
mostly, the interface between technology and society. Thus, it would turn out to be quite 
misleading to envisage the affirmation of new GPTs without taking into explicit account the 
inter-relations with other elements of the existing economic system, including of course 
other technologies. 
 
The aim of this paper is to review the development of steam power technology in the light 
of the key ideas proposed in GPT growth models. It seems to us, that this is a particularly 
fruitful perspective for drawing a preliminary appraisal of the merits and limitations of this 
class of endogenous growth models.  
 
2.  The economic impact of the steam engine (A tale of two Nicks) 
 
Writing in 1845 Friedrich Engels (and with him many other informed contemporaries) had 
few hesitations in identifying the driving forces of the epochal transformation he was 
witnessing:  “The history of the proletariat in England begins with the second half of the last 
century, with the invention of the steam engine and of machinery for working cotton. These 
inventions gave rise, as is well known, to an industrial revolution, a revolution which altered 
the whole civil society; one, the historical importance of which is only now beginning to be 
recognized” (Engels, 1845, p. 15).    
 
This view of the early phases of industrialization, ascribing a central role to the steam engine 
as driver not only of economic growth, but also of other dramatic changes such as the rise of 
the factory system, was (and still is) resumed in a major part of the historical studies on the 
British industrial revolution. Writing about one hundred years after Engels, T.S. Ashton (an 
author whose ideological standpoint was indeed poles apart from Engels’) regarded the 
steam engine as “the pivot on which industry swung into the modern age” (Ashton, 1948, p. 
58). Perhaps the most terse version of this “traditional” account of the British industrial 
revolution is the one given by Landes (1969). Landes considers the industrial revolution as 
the outcome of a combination of three interrelated streams of  technical advances:  
 
1)  “mechanization”, that is the substitution in a wide range of production process of 
machines (“rapid, regular, precise, tireless”) for human skills 
2)  adoption of new power sources, most importantly the steam engine which permitted 
the utilization an almost boundless energy supply 
3)  extensive use of new raw materials (in particular the substitution of minerals for 
animal and vegetable substances, most prominently the substitution of iron for 
wood).  
 
These innovations revolutionized production processes in a wide array of industries 
determining  a marked acceleration in the rate of productivity growth. Furthermore, they 
“compelled” the adoption of a new mode of production, the factory system.   
 
  4In more than one sense, Landes’ account can still be considered as broadly accurate. 
However, it is important to remark that more recent research has suggested that a number of 
substantial qualifications ought to be added to it. Unfortunately, we do not the have the 
space to discuss here the current historical debate on the British industrial revolution, 
however for the limited purposes of this paper it will be sufficient to refer to Landes’ 
account.    
 
The picture emerging from traditional accounts of early industrialization, such as the one 
provided by Landes,  is one in which steam power seems to be one, but it is worth stressing  
only one, of the core driving forces of a wide process of economic transformation. Even if 
considering  the ambit  of technology only, Landes suggests that the steam engine was one 
component of three interlinked  streams of technological advances. 
 
In the context of this complex historical process in which an intricate set of mutually 
interacting forces were at work, the task of providing a quantitative evaluation of the 
economic significance of a “macro-innovation” such as the steam engine appears to be a 
remarkably arduous.   
 
However, though formidable, these difficulties have not discouraged research efforts. More 
than twenty years ago, Nick von Tunzelmann (1978), adopting a social saving framework of 
analysis in combination with a more traditional appraisal of backward and forward linkages, 
provided a careful assessment of the economic effects of steam power technology. More 
recently, Nick Crafts (2003) has produced a new estimation of the economic impact of steam  
using a standard growth accounting framework. It is useful to discuss these two 
contributions by considering first Crafts’ exercise. 
 
In order to evaluate the contribution of steam power to productivity growth, Crafts adopts a 
modified version of the standard growth accounting framework. The rather straightforward 
extension consists simply in distinguishing between different types of capital (steam and 
other) and in decomposing TFP in two components, one associated with technical advances 
in the production of steam capital  and the other related to “non steam” TFP growth.   
   
As is well known, Nelson (1981)  has compellingly argued against the overall interpretative 
relevance of this type of exercises. In a nutshell, the main issue is the neglect of the 
“interaction”  between technical change and capital accumulation. This consideration casts 
non minor doubts on the general validity of  TFP as a reliable measurement of the 
contribution of technical change to labour productivity growth.  
 
Table 1: Annual Cost per Steam HP per year (current £) 







Source: Crafts (2003), p. 19. 
 
  5However, although Crafts’ exercise is couched in the standard growth accounting 
framework, it employs a rather unorthodox method for estimating the impact of TFP on 
labour productivity growth. Instead of calculating the rate of technical change in steam 
power technical change as a TFP residual, Crafts  gives a direct estimate of the impact of 
technical progress of labour productivity growth. Crafts calculates the contribution of steam 
TFP to aggregate productivity growth by estimating the aggregate social savings determined 
by the reductions in steam power costs presented in Table 1.
2 The data on the reduction in 
steam power costs collated by Crafts are reported in table 1 (data are in current pounds, 
Crafts uses the GDP deflator to convert them in real prices).  The data refer to what Crafts 
considers to be a normal context of steam engine usage: a textile mill in Lancashire.  
 
The social savings are simply calculated by multiplying the decrease in the real cost of a 
steam HP between two periods with the total steam HP in use in the final year. This, clearly, 
represents the costs that, ceteris paribus, the economy would have sustained assuming that 
steam technology had not improved with respect to the initial year.  Estimates of the extent 
of steam usage in the years of table 1 are taken from Kanefsky (1979)’s study of the diffusion 
of steam power technology in British industry. Kanefsky’s data consider total steam HP 
employed in manufacturing and in mining. It is important to note that these data (here 
presented in table 2) intend to cover power capacity installed rather than that actual power 
use. Although the picture of the diffusion of steam power emerging from table 2 is probably 
roughly correct, in our judgment, these figures still contain some overestimation of the 
extension of the use of steam vis-à-vis the two other sources of power, especially for the years 
1760,1800, and 1830. This mainly because very small productive units (which typically 
employed wind and water) are likely to have gone unnoticed.  Notwithstanding this 
consideration, the slow growth of steam power until the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century is still apparent.   
 
Table 2: Sources of Power in Use in HP (mainly mining and manufacturing) 
Year Steam  (%) Water (%) Wind (%) 
1760 5000 5.88  70000  82.35  10000 11.76 
1800 35000 20.59  120000  70.59  15000 8.82 
1830 160000 47.06  160000  47.06  20000 5.88 
1870 2060000 89.57 230000 10.00 10000 0.43 
1907 9659000 98.14 178000 1.81  5000  0.05 
Source: Kanefsky (1979), p. 338. 
 
Kanefsky’s figures  also allow to Crafts to calculate the contribution of capital deepening in 
steam power to labour productivity growth. This is done by multiplying the growth of capital 
intensity in steam for an estimate of the share of steam capital in total income.  The results  
of Crafts’ growth accounting exercise are given in table 3.  
 
Crafts, employing a similar methodology, also calculates the contribution to labour 
productivity growth from steam power employing in railways. Here, data availability force 
Crafts to compute the contribution stemming from the total reduction in transport costs 
determined by the railways on labour productivity growth. In these calculations, Crafts uses 
                                                 
2 It can be shown that, when the standard assumptions are satisfied,  the rate of TFP growth is equivalent to 
the real cost reduction (Harberger, 1998).  
  6the social savings estimates of Hawke (1970) and Foreman Peck (1991).  The total 
contributions of stationary steam engine plus railways as calculated by Crafts are given in 
table 4.   
 
Table 3: Contributions to labour productvity growth 
from stationary steam power (% per year) 
Years  1760-1800 1800-1830 1830-1850 1850-1870 1870-1910 
Rates of growth:       
Steam  HP  per  worker  4.3 3.90 4.2 5.20 3.9 
TFP in steam technology 2.8 0.00 1.2 3.50 1.7 
       
Contributions:       
Capital  deepening  (A)  0.004  0.02 0.02 0.06 0.09 
TFP  (B)  0.005  0.00 0.02 0.06 0.05 
Total contribution (A+B):  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.12  0.14 
       
Steam income share (%) 0.1 0.40 0.5 1.20 2.2 
Social Savings (as % of GDP) 0.2  0.00  0.3 1.20 1.8 
Source: Crafts (2003), p. 20. 
 
 
Table 4: Total contribution to British labour productivity 
from steam engine technology (% per year) 
Years 
 






Labour productivity growth 
 
1760-1800 0.01  -  0.01  0.25  (1760-80); 0.9 (1780-1831) 
1800-1830 0.02  -  0.02  0.9  (1780-1831) 
1830-1850 0.04  0.16  0.2 1.65  (1831-1873) 
1850-1870 0.12  0.26  0.38 1.65  (1831-1873) 
1870-1910 0.14  0.07  0.21  1.55(1873-1899);0.85(1899-1913) 
Source: Crafts (2003), p. 22; for total labour productivity growth Crafts (1995), p. 752. 
 
Crafts estimates show that steam power technology, during his heyday (which should clearly 
be in the second half of the nineteenth century) gave a sizable contribution to overall 
productivity growth, although never a overwhelming one.  In the period 1830-1870 the 
largest contribution from steam came through the “railroadization”  of the British economy. 
The contribution  from stationary steam engines was remarkably “small” until the 1850s. In 
the second half of the nineteenth century the contribution from stationary steam grew in size 
achieving its peak in the 1870-1910 sub-period. However, even in this phase, the 
contribution from stationary steam did not account for  more than 17% of aggregate 
productivity growth.   
 
As we have suggested before, growth accounting exercises are to be interpreted with more 
than particular caution (if not with outright scepticism). However, in this case, data 
limitations have forced Crafts to provide a direct estimation of the contributions of steam 
technology by reviving the social saving approach, rather than estimating the economic 
impact of technical change as a residual. We would like to contend that this can be 
considered as a rather sound  “guesstimate” of the direct impact economic impact of  steam 
  7power technology (in particular, the last row of table 3, where the social savings are 
expressed as percentage of GDP provides us with a rough estimate of the orders of 
magnitude in question). 
3 Note that these estimates must be regarded as upper bounds, 
because they do not allow for readjustments from firms and other economic units in the 
counterfactual world without technical progress.  
 
Let us now turn our attention to the contribution of capital deepening.  Here, at least for 
those not converted to the neoclassical theory of production, the shortcomings troubling 
growth accounting exercises re-emerge. In particular, the partial elasticity of output with 
respect to (steam) capital is estimated using the income share of steam capital. In spite of 
this, table 3 still conveys an important message concerning the rate of accumulation of steam 
capital. As can been seen from the first row of the table, the rate of accumulation in 
stationary steam power, although sustained, was never spectacular.  
 





% of steam in the 




% of steam in the 
gross stock of capital 
(Plant, machinery 
and equipment) 
1760 0.21 1.17  0.81 
1800 1.96 3.44  2.61 
1830 9.6 7.22  7.87 
1870 51.5 9.77  11.03 
1907 144.885 12.26  12.81 
Note: Calculated using the data on steam capital cost per HP (replacement costs) from Crafts (2003, p. 19), the 
data on total HP installed from Kanefsky (1979, p.338, here in table 2), data on the gross capital stock from 
Feinstein (1988, pp. 437-440).  
 
For sake of comparison, the annual rate of growth of railway capital per worker in the period 
1830-1850 was equal to 22.8 % (Crafts, 2003, p.21).  
In our view, this indicates that the (expected) rates of return in stationary steam did never 
greatly exceed those of other forms of investment. Accumulation of steam capital in industry 
was not driven by sharp investment booms. As a consequence, the substitution between 
water power and steam was protracted and long delayed. 
 
Table 5 gives estimates of the share of steam capital in the total capital stock. In particular, 
we have computed two figures, one for the share of steam in the total capital stock in mining 
and manufacturing and one by type of asset which considers the share of steam in the 
“plant, machinery and equipment” stock of the total economy. This can be taken as a rough 
indication of the relative “weight” of steam technology in the stock of capital. Rather 
consistently with what we have noticed so far, the share of steam seems to attain a sizable 
share in the stock of capital only in the late nineteenth century.    
 
 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that the estimate of the social savings proposed by Crafts for the period 1760-1800 is 
consistent with the social savings calculated by von Tunzelmann (1978, p.149) with a more sophisticated 
approach (0.11 per cent of GDP).  
  8Table 6: Steam power by industry, 1800-1907 




(%) Steam  HP 
(power in 
use) 




Mining  1064  48.56 360000 26.22  2415841  26.49 
Textiles  469 21.41 513335 37.39  1873169  20.54 
Metal manufactures  263 12.00 329683 24.01  2165243  23.74 
Food and drink trades  112  5.11 22956 1.67  266299  2.92 
Paper manufactures  13 0.59 27971 2.04  179762  1.97 
Building trades  12  0.55 17220 1.25  347647  3.81 
Chemicals  18 0.82 21400 1.56  182456  2.00 
Public utility (waterworks, canals, 
etc.) 
80 3.65 36000 2.62  1379376  15.13 
Others  160  7.30 44375 3.23  309025  3.39 
Total  2191 100 1372940 100 9118818 100 
Sources: for 1800, Kanefsky and Robey (1980), for 1870 and 1907, Musson (1978) taking into account the 
adjustments suggested in Kanefsky (1979).  
 
 Table 6 collates the available quantitative evidence on the penetration of steam technology 
across industries in various years. As the table shows,  the spread of steam technology in 
British industry was heavily concentrated in a handful of sectors. In all three years considered in 
table 6  mining, textiles and metal manufactures account for more than 50 % of steam 
industrial power.  In this respect, traditional accounts of industrialization that have depicted 
an economy running exclusively on steam are clearly in need of some revision. In fact, the 
progress of steam powered mechanization was far from being uniform both across and 
within industries.
4 Even in sectors that employed steam intensively, a number of  critical 
phases of the production process continued to be carried out using hand tools well up to the 
late  nineteenth century (for a very good overview of the balance between steam power and 
hand technology in different industries, see Samuel, 1977).   
 
It should be stressed that Crafts’ estimates consider only the direct impact of steam power 
technology on labour productivity growth. In other words, they asses the impact of  the first 
two properties of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg’ s definition of GPT namely, the pervasiveness 
(which obviously corresponds to the capital deepening effect) and the technological 
dynamism (which corresponds to the rate of TFP). The “innovational complementarities” of 
steam power are completely left out of the picture.  The neglect of “innovational 
complementarities” was originally remarked by Paul David (1975, chap. 6) in his critique of 
Fogel’s social savings calculation of the “railroadization” of the US economy during the 
nineteenth century. Clearly, if the technology in question stimulates the generation of further 
technical or organizational innovations  in the application sectors, its economic impact 
cannot be appropriately assessed by means of social saving calculations. 
 
 Accordingly, von Tunzelmann (1978) decided  not to limit his appraisal to the social saving 
calculation, but he provided an evaluation of the forward linkages of the steam engine. The 
approach followed by von Tunzelmann (1978) was to examine in detail the technical and 
economic evolution of the textile industries, searching for possible links between 
                                                 
4 As Samuel (1977) as noted, in many production processes formidable technical difficulties frustrated the 
continuous attempts of developing  ‘self-acting’ machines. 
  9improvements in steam power technology and the introduction and/or diffusion of textile 
innovations. Von Tunzelmann (1978) analysis of the evolution of textile technologies reveals 
that spillovers from steam were, by and large, negligible during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the forward linkages 
between steam and the textile sectors became more consistent, and, in some specific cases,  
it is possible to relate the adoption of innovative vintages of “automatic” machinery to 
reductions in steam power costs.  
 
Another attempt to estimate the economic impact of steam technology has been recently 
carried out by Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2001). In particular, Rosenberg and Trajtenberg 
argue that, in the United States, steam technology became an “engine of growth” only with 
the development of the Corliss’ engine design. Corliss’ design determined a reduction in 
steam power costs which moved the cost differential between water power and steam 
decidedly in favour of the latter. According to Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, this induced a 
major relocation of production activities towards urban centres permitting the exploitation 
of major agglomeration economies and, in this way, fostering economic growth. It is worth 
noting that Rosenberg and Trajtenberg empirical study merely assesses the existence of a 
correlation across space between the adoption of Corliss engine and population growth. 
Hence, most of the hypothesis proposed in their paper concerning the link between Corliss 
engine and economic growth ought still be considered conjectural. Interestingly enough, 
Rosenberg and Trajtenberg were unable to find direct evidence of “innovational 
complementarities”. It is worth to quote their remarks at length:   
 
We also devoted significant efforts toward searching for evidence of innovational complementarities in the 
more straightforward sense of the Corliss engine ‘prompting’ improvements in specific user sectors. However 
we could not find compelling, first hand evidence to that effect. We did find repeated assertions that the 
improved regularity of motion delivered by the Corliss allowed textile manufactures to move up the quality 
ladder from low-grade coarse fabrics to finer grades of cotton yarns and other fibers such as wool. There is also 
some material suggesting that the performance advantages of the Corliss may have prompted the (re)design of 
more efficient textile mills. The problem is that we could not find the empirical equivalent of a ‘smoking gun’ 
in this respect ...(Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2001, p. 8).  
 
This shows again that the assessment of the “innovational complementarities” involves a 
painstaking detailed historical investigation of the interdependencies between different 
technological trajectories.   
 
Using the data on the comparative diffusion of steam power included in Landes (1969) and 
dating back to Dictionary of Statistics  by Mulhall (1909),  we may draw an admittedly naive 
picture of the relationship between the level of national income and the extent  of steam 
power penetration in each country. Figure 1 would seem to powerfully prove that national 
economic performances of industrial countries during the 19
th century may be fully explained 
by the comparative diffusion of the steam engine technology. Notably, one remarkable 
exception to this pattern is given by Netherlands. Still, most observations contribute to a 
picture which indeed appears ‘too good to be true’. Indeed those aware of the limitations of 
the historical source used by Landes  may actually conjecture that the estimates of steam 
horsepower installed was constructed in such a way  to reflect the commonly perceived 
ranking of industrial countries in terms of economic power, e.g. UK being the leader with 
both the highest level of income and the highest degree of technological achievements. As a 
matter of fact, a few historical accounts (see Kanefsky, 1979 for the UK and Lintsen, 1995 
  10for the Netherlands) have contested the  overall reliability of these data on the diffusion of 
steam technology. 
 
Figure 1: Steam power installed and real GDP levels, 1850-1896  
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Source: for GDP levels and population data from Maddison (2001), data on steam HP installed from Landes 
(1969), p. 221.   
 
At this juncture, it is probably useful to summarize our survey of the historical literature 
concerned with the economic impact of steam power technology. Some features of the 
economic history of the steam engine seems to be neatly captured by the GPT view of the 
economic growth, others appears, instead, more problematic. 
 
Clearly, the protracted and long delayed diffusion process of steam technology is consistent 
with the prolonged “acclimatization” phase posited by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg. 
 
Being a prime mover, the steam engine  was almost ex definitione  a technology endowed with 
a high degree of “pervasiveness”. However our discussion has suggested that 
“pervasiveness” can be measured along many dimensions and that radical innovations such 
as steam, electricity and ICT are likely to be widely different in this respect. Perhaps a 
possible solution to this problem would be to elaborate a more rigorous definition of 
pervasiveness in terms of an input-output framework (Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1984; see 
Verspagen 2002, for an interesting attempt of identifying pervasive technologies using input-
output data). 
 
  11Steam power was also a technology endowed with a certain degree of technological 
dynamism, in the sense that its efficiency was progressively increased by means of a 
succession of  refinements and improvements. This appears to be clearly consistent with the 
GPT definition. However, it is also worth noting that the rate of improvement (according to 
the data collected by Crafts) was for long periods of time far from being particularly 
remarkable. This contributes to account for the slow substitution between steam and water 
power.  
 
Historians of the steam engine (see, for example, Hills, 1989) have also pointed to various 
examples of  “innovational complementarities” from steam. As mentioned, von Tunzelmann 
(1978) has shown that these assumed sizable economic significance only from 1840 onwards. 
A precise quantification of the economic gains stemming from this form of spillovers has 
not been so far attempted. If we were asked to put forward a wild guess, we would contend 
that the, overall (that is to say direct plus spillover effect) the contribution of steam to 
economic growth in the second half of the nineteenth century was surely palpable, but it was 
far from obliterating other sources of economic growth, in particular, given the resilience of 
hand-technology pointed out by Samuel (1977), of transformations of the labour process.     
 
 
3  The development of the high pressure expansive engine 
 
In this section we want to examine in detail the issue of the “technological dynamism” of the 
GPT. As we have seen, in his calculations of social savings, Crafts considers the reduction in 
the annual cost for one steam HP in what he deems to be a typical situation, a textile mill in 
Lancashire. The critical innovation underlying the major part of the reduction in steam 
power costs presented in table 1 was undoubtedly the development of the high pressure 
expansive engine (for a thorough overview of the evolution of steam engine technology, see 
Hills, 1989).  
 
Interestingly enough, the high pressure expansive engine was introduced before the 
attainment of a consolidated theoretical understanding of the working principles of the 
steam engine. Cornish engineers took the lead in the exploration of this specific 
technological trajectory. The Cornish mining district was endowed with very rich lodes of tin 
and copper, whose exploitation, however, was severely hampered by flooding problems. The 
development of steam power technology (in this case in the form of steam pumping engines) 
provided an effective solution to mine drainage. In Cornwall, coal had to be imported from 
Wales by sea and, for this reason, was particularly expensive. As a consequence, Cornish 
mine entrepreneurs were eagerly interested in improvements in the efficiency of the steam 
engine that could curtail their dear fuel bill. Starting in 1811, they sponsored a monthly 
publication containing detailed reports on the performance (measured in ‘lbs. of water raised 
one foot high per bushel of coal consumed’ or, as it was termed by contemporary engineers, 
the ‘duty’ of the engine), technical details and operating procedures of the steam pumping 
engines at work in the county. Joel Lean, a highly respected mine engineer, was entrusted 
with the compilation of the reports and the publication was known as Lean’s Engine Reporter. 
 
The publication of Lean’s Reporter marked the transition of the Cornish mining district to a 
peculiar form of innovation process which Robert Allen (1983) has labelled “collective 
invention”. In collective invention settings, rival firms prefer to reciprocally share the new 
  12technological knowledge they discover, rather than protecting it using patents. When 
innovations are highly cumulative, regimes of collective invention are likely to yield higher 
rates of technical progress than those based on “closed” and proprietary knowledge. 
Interestingly enough, in the contemporary engineering literature, engines built on the basis 
of the Cornish design principles were not ascribed to this or that particular engineer, but 
simply known as “Cornish” engines, properly acknowledging the cooperative and cumulative 
character of this particular form of technological development. Nuvolari (2004) provides a 
detailed account of the institutional set-up supporting inventive activities in steam 
engineering in the Cornish mining district.      
 
Walter Vincenti (1990, chap. 5) has argued that engineers typically make use of systematic 
data collection and analysis to bypass the absence of an adequate theoretical understanding of 
the operative principles of a technology. This was exactly the situation in early nineteenth 
century steam engine technology. At that time, the steam engine was still conceived as a 
vapour-pressure engine and not as a heat engine, so that there were no theoretical principles 
that could account for the impact on the efficiency of the engine of the use of high-pressure 
steam and of the principle of expansion. Systematic collection and analysis of performance 
data allowed to Cornish engineers to consistently individuate  fruitful lines of technical 
advance, so that, between 1820 and 1840, the Cornish pumping engine represented the 
highest engineering achievement in steam power technology.  




















































Sources: 1769,1772, 1776, 1778 (Lean, 1839);1779,1786, 1792 (Dickinson and Jenkins, 1927);1798 Gilbert 
(1830); 1811-1872 (Lean II, 1872); 1873-1895 Trestrail (1896). 
 
As a matter of fact, immediately afterwards the publication of the engine reports, the 
thermodynamic efficiency of Cornish engines begun to improve steadily. Figure 2 displays 
  13the behaviour of the “duty” of Cornish pumping engines as portrayed in Lean’s Engine 
Reporter.  
 
The figure clearly shows the phase of relative “stagnation” of the late eighteenth century and 
the rapid growth phase from the 1810s. This phase of rapid growth of technological 
performance (characterized by three rather sharp bursts) appears to cover approximately the 
period 1811-1846. After that, in accordance to Wolf’s law, Cornish technological practice 
seems to run into diminishing returns. This coupled, with deeper mining shafts and harder 
drainage conditions, determined a deterioration in the efficiency of the engines. 
 
It is particularly interesting to compare figure 1 with table 1. According to table 1, the period 
1800-1830 is phase of stagnation where steam engine does not make any progress with 
respect to Watt times. In figure 1, instead the period 1810-1830 is a phase of staggering 
improvement in engine performance.      
 
It cannot be assumed that the Cornish experience passed by unnoticed. In fact, some of the 
most competent contemporary observers paid a great deal of attention to technological 
developments introduced in Cornwall. For example, John Farey, changing quite drastically 
his initial publication plan, devoted the major part of the (unfinished) second volume of his 
opus magnum, to the Cornish engine, making extensive use of the data contained in Lean’s 
Engine Reporter. 
5 The superior fuel efficiency of the engines of the Cornish type was also 
widely discussed in France by scientists and engineers interested in the functioning of the 
steam engines.
6 Sadi Carnot himself concluded his Reflexions sur la puissance motrice de feu 
mentioning the duty of 56 millions achieved by the engine erected by Arthur Woolf at the 
Wheal Abraham mine.   
 
Thus, a large body of engineering literature on steam technology in the early nineteenth 
century was informed by the debate on the different technological practice characterizing the 
employment of steam power in Cornwall (where it was adopted the high pressure expansive 
engine) versus the rest of Britain, especially the manufacturing districts of the North, where 
the favourite option was the Watt low pressure engine.   
The superior fuel efficiency of the Cornish practice led many contemporaries to describe this 
situation in terms of  a “technology gap” between Cornwall and the rest of the country.  
Among others, N. P. Burgh, in A Practical Treatise on the Condensation of Steam published in 
1871, described the general complacent attitude towards the adoption of technical novelties 
in steam engines prevailing in the textile manufacturing districts in the early nineteenth 
century in these terms:  
 
The matter before them was all-sufficient because it answered up to a certain point of working duty, and thus 
mutual contentment reigned where an equal desire for further knowledge ought to have been (cited in Hills, 1989, 
p. 113, italics added).   
                                                 
5 According to the original plan, the second volume should have comprised two parts: the first describing the 
developments in engine design occurred in the early nineteenth century, the second one outlining a scientific 
analysis of the working of the steam engine, see Woolrich (2002).  
6  In the 1810s the  Cornish engine reports were reprinted regularly in Annales de Chemie et de Physique (see 
Cardwell 1971, p.157, also for other examples of early French inquiries on the performance of Cornish steam 
engines). In the same period, the Philosophical Magazine edited by Alexander Tilloch (one of the “patrons” of 
Arthur Woolf during his permanence in London) published summaries of Lean’s report.  
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William Fairbairn,
7 a highly influential character of the Lancashire engineering community, 
was one of the leading advocates of the technical merits of the high pressure expansive 
engine. However his pleadings remained for a long period unfulfilled:  
 
For a great number of years a strong prejudice existed against the use of high pressure steam and it required 
more than ordinary care in effecting the changes which have been introduced: it had to be done cautiously, 
almost insidiously, before it could be introduced. The author of this paper believes he was amongst the first in 
the Manufacturing Districts who pointed out the advantages of high pressure steam when worked expansively, 
and for many years he had to contend with the fears and prejudices of the manufacturers... (Fairbairn, 1849, pp. 
23-24)     
 
Similarly, John Farey (1971, p. 307) denounced a widespread and culpable “state of apathy as 
to consumption of fuel”  in the “great manufacturing districts of the North”. 
8 
 
Up to the late 1830s, other commentators remained instead rather sceptical of the fuel 
efficiency of Cornish engines, actually denying the existence of a Cornish technological lead 
in steam engineering. This was also partially due to the fact that the superior fuel efficiency 
stemming from the expansive use high pressure steam remained theoretically unaccounted 
for. As a consequence, the dramatic early rise of the duty of the (best-practice) Cornish 
expansive engines (in the 1810s up to more than 40 millions and by the late 1820s to more 
than 80 millions) was not easily accepted outside Cornwall. In 1836 there was a heated 
debate on the pages of Mechanic’s Magazine on the general reliability of the “reported” duty 
figures of Cornish engines. Two years later,  G. H. Palmer published an article in Transactions 
of the Institutions of Civil Engineers, in which he contended that the levels of fuel efficiency 
claimed for the Cornish engine were undoubtedly exaggerated (because in open contrast 
with the caloric theory of heat):
9  
 
If the statements given to the public  by the Cornish engineers, whose sincerity I cannot doubt  are correct, I 
dare not trust to call nature to account for the undue favouritism she confers upon our Cornish friends  by 
enabling them to perform results  that the London, Manchester and Birmingham engineers cannot 
approach.......Upon what principle then, permit me to ask, can the Cornish engines perform so much more than 
all other engines. Strong, indeed, should be the evidence that ought to outweigh or cancel the....laws of nature, 
and induce this Institution to sanction statements  of duty more than double of the best Watt engine, and still 
more, surpassing the limits Nature has assigned steam to perform. (Palmer, 1838, pp. 44-46)  
 
The most strenuous defender of  Lancashire technical practice was perhaps Robert 
Armstrong. In his Essay on the Boilers of Steam Engines published in 1839, he declared that the 
Cornish duty figures were undoubtedly “gross exaggerations”, the real duty probably being 
equal to about 30 millions. He concluded that “there is nothing in the Cornish system of 
management that can be profitably imitated by…..[Lancashire engineers]” (cited in Pole, 
1844, p. 59).  
 
                                                 
7 For an appraisal of the life and activities on William Fairbairn , see Musson (1970).   
8 D.K. Clark described the English engines presented at the 1862 International Exhibition in London in these 
blunt terms: “[The engines of English builders] in general testified to a feeling of absolute indifference to 
economy of steam or fuel, and probably in some instances, to ignorance of the conditions on which 
economical working is to be established” (cited in Hunter, 1985, p. 600).    
9 In the same article Palmer, on the basis of the caloric theory of heat, fixed the maximum duty attainable by a 
steam engine to 44 millions (Palmer, 1838, p. 46)   
  15Widespread incredulity in the virtues of high pressure steam surely hindered the diffusion of 
high pressure designs in the early nineteenth century, however it is important to recognize 
that other factors were affecting adoption decisions. As a matter of fact, the most simple 
explanation that can be put forward for the different technological practice between 
Cornwall and the other manufacturing areas of Britain (say Lancashire) is that this divide 
reflected the local circumstances of steam usage, in particular the differences in coal prices. 
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Sources: for Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham and London: von Tunzelmann (1978, p. 97); for Hayle: von 
Tunzelmann (1974, pp. 199-200).   
 
 
As suggested by the available data, coal prices were higher in Cornwall (the region could not 
rely on any local supply of coal and all the coal employed had to shipped from South Wales) 
than in Lancashire throughout the period in question. 
 
Figure 3 displays the behaviour of coal prices in various location for the period 1800-1850. 
In this time span, price of coals in Cornwall appear to have been higher than those prevailing 
in Lancashire (Manchster), Yorkshire (Leeds) and in the Midlands (Birmingham). It could 
then be argued that the differential rates of technical progress in the different British regions 
naturally reflected the local availability of coal supplies. This clearly would amount to a 
simple “scarcity-push” explanation of the differential rates of technical progress. In this 
respect, note that the price of coal in London (a location whose technical practice was 
similar to Lancashire) instead, was higher than in Cornwall.  
 
The contemporary engineering literature, rather than a “scarcity-push” explanation suggested 
the existence of highly uneven technological opportunities related to the different 
applications of the steam engine (for driving machinery in the North of England and for 
  16pumping mines in Cornwall).  The fuel efficiency attained by using  high pressure steam 
expansively engine was lower for rotary engines than for pumping  (reciprocating) ones (this 
because in reciprocating engines the early cut-off of steam in the cylinder could be exploited 
to a larger extent). Some of the available evidence however does not fit in this picture, 
pointing again instead to disbelief in Cornish achievements.  
The first high pressure engine pumping engine erected in the London was installed at the 
London waterworks as late as 1838. The installation was preceded by a travel of Thomas 
Wicksteed (the engineer of the London waterworks) to Cornwall where he conducted a 
detailed research on the merits of the Cornish engine (Wicksteed, 1836, 1838, 1841). In one 
of his papers, Wicksteed listed a number of technical innovations which characterized the 
Cornish high pressure practice, which had no counterpart in London (Wicksteed, 1836, pp. 
122-125). Although Wicksteed heartily encouraged the shift to the Cornish engine, the 
management of the waterworks was still rather reluctant and the engine was finally installed 
only under the condition that it would perform a duty of 90 millions over twelve consecutive 
months, otherwise a penalty had to be paid (Barton, 1965, p. 258). 
 
The delayed adoption of high pressure expansive engines at the London waterworks (where 
engines could be employed rather straightforwardly according to the Cornish practice and 
where the cost incentive was higher than in Cornwall) clearly demonstrates the existence of a 
technology gap between Cornwall and the rest of England, at least as far as reciprocating 
engines are concerned.  However even when entrenched disbeliefs in the fuel superiority of 
high pressure expansive engine had been dispelled, it was still doubtful whether Cornish 
practice  could have been successfully transferred to mill operations, where the application 
of  the steam engine to industrial processes generally required a smooth piston movement.   
 
It is a question, also, whether the extreme use of the Cornish system is suitable for those manufacturing 
engines, one great and essential quality of which is uniformity of motion. A steady velocity in the motive 
power, is of such consequence in cotton spinning, and several other of the arts, that any loss of it would be 
dearly by economic gain. The momentum of machinery, is but trifling: and an equivalent must be found for it, 
in order to obtain the whole value of the Cornish system (Parkes, 1842, p. 67). 
 
Josiah Parkes wrote so in 1842. Some of the problems created by the irregular power cycle 
could be solved by expanding the steam in separate cylinders, reviving in this way, the Woolf 
compound design, which had not been crowned with much success in Cornwall.
10 This 
involved some loss of fuel efficiency. As William Pole noted:  
 
Th[e] principle...[of expansion] has hitherto been applied to the greatest advantage in engines with a single 
cylinder, used for pumping purposes, as in Cornwall. In these cases the peculiar nature of the motion admits of 
the steam being cut off after a small fraction of the stroke has been commenced, and allowed to expand during 
the remainder. When however the principle of expansion is applied in this mode to engines for producing 
rotary motion, some difficulties arise, which limit considerably the extent that the expansion may be carried to, 
and therefore reduce in a corresponding degree the economy of fuel. The Double Cylinder Engine offers a 
mode of applying the expansive principle to rotary motion, which removes or at least greatly mitigates the 
objections to the single cylinder...(Pole, 1862, p. 242).   
 
A quantitative estimate of the profitability of the high pressure expansive engine for 
powering mill machinery has been provided by von Tunzelmann. More specifically, Von 
                                                 
10 Josiah Parkes suggested an alternative solution: the adoption of Cornish pumping engines as “water 
returning” engines for cotton mills (Parkes, 1842, pp. 67-68).  
  17Tunzelmann (1978, p. 91)  has calculated the “threshold” coal price at which, it would have 
been economically worthwhile in “rotary” applications to switch from a Watt low pressure 
engine to a high-pressure one, in about 1835 as 12 s. per ton. As it is evident from the 
behaviour of the coal price series of  figure 2 in the North (Lancashire and Yorkshire) coal 
prices were, at least since the early 1820s below that level. Hence, notwithstanding  its 
superior fuel efficiency, the high pressure engine did not represent the most economic 
option (given its higher capital costs) in locations where the price of coal was low.  
 
This result, according to von Tunzelmann, goes some way in the direction of rehabilitating  
Lancashire entrepreneurs from the “damnation”
 11 to which contemporaries, such as Farey 
had condemned them:  
 
The failure may have been one of the inventors rather than the businessmen: inventors were unable to come up 
with a satisfactory high-pressure rotative engine until about the mid 1830s (von Tunzelmann, 1978, p. 90). 12   
 
Table 7: Prices and Capital costs for the engines produced by Benjamin Hick, 1841 

















Engine 960  1130  1170  1350 
Boiler  240 320 280 400 
Total  1200 1450 1450 1750 
Cost p.a.  162  197.25  195.25  238.75 
Cost per HP p.a.  4.05  4.931  3.905  4.775 
Source: Hills (1989), p. 119. In calculating capital cost p.a., following von Tunzelmann (1978), p. 72, we have 
made the subsequent assumptions: depreciation rate set at 7.5% p.a. for the engine and at 12.5% p.a. for the 
boiler, interest rate set at 5%.  
 
This situation seems to have changed rather drastically by the early 1840s. We can compute 
the threshold coal price between a low pressure condensing engine and a high pressure one 
for 1841 using a list of prices for the steam engines produced by Benjamin Hick. Hick was 
one of the pioneers of the introduction of compound high pressure engine on the Woolf 
plan in the textile industries and his engines are probably to be considered as  best-practice 
for the time.
13 
                                                 
11 “From damnation to redemption: judgments on the late Victorian entrepreneur” is the title of a famous 
paper by McCloskey and Sandberg (1971), in which the thesis of an entrepreneurial failure (i.e., technological 
conservatism) of late nineteenth century Britain put forward by historians such as Landes (1969) is rebutted.  
12 The Woolf rotative engine was imported quite successfully in France by his former partner Edwards in the 
late 1810s. In 1824, a witness before a Parliamentary Committee declared that, to that date, about 300 Woolf 
engines had been erected in France by Edwards (Jenkins, 1933, p. 61). Rotative engines on Woolf design 
(although in very small numbers) were also produced  by some manufacturers in Britain during the 1820s.   
13 A glowing appraisal of Hick’s compound engines is given in Farey (1971, p. 306) :“Mr Woolf’s engines have 
never been tried, and are scarcely known in the great manufacturing districts in the North of England and in 
Scotland. It should be mentioned that Mr Hick of Bolton, in Lancashire,  has of  late taken up the making of 
Mr Woolf’s compound engines, and has made two engines of a larger size than any previous engine of the kind. 
They are excellent specimens, and improved proportions of the parts, with every perfection of execution which 
has hitherto been attained in the construction of steam engines; and although both have been sent abroad, one 
  18 
 
In Table 7 we report Hick’s prices and our estimates of the annual capital costs for engines 




In his price list, Hick also indicated figures for the fuel consumption of the engines: the low 
pressure engine consumed 14 lbs. of coal per HP-hour, whilst the Woolf compound, 5 lbs.
15  
Note that 5 lbs. of coal per HP-hour correspond to a duty of approximately 37 millions 
(Pole, 1843, p. 171). The average duty of Cornish pumping engines (acccording to Lean’s 
reports) in the same period (early 1840s) was above 50 millions (see figure 1). This difference 
can be taken as a (rough) indication of the loss in fuel efficiency determined by the use of 
the high pressure engine with a regular piston movement and not with the very irregular 
Cornish cycle. 
 
With the level of fuel efficiencies stated by Hick, assuming that the engines worked on 
average 3800 hours a year,
16 the threshold coal price for the engines (of both sizes) in table 7 
is equal to about 1 s. 1 d a ton.
17 This price is even lower than the cost of “slack” coal at the 
colliery pithead.
18 Our calculation, thus, suggests that in the early 1840s the high pressure 
technology had already become profitable for any (conceivable) level of coal prices. In fact, 
from the late 1830s, manufacturing areas begun slowly to install high pressure engines (see 
von Tunzelmann, 1978, p. 85). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to France, and the other to Spain, they will probably lead to the introduction of such engines in the 
manufactories of Lancashire,” 
14 See, for example, Hills (1989), p. 116.  
15 Zachariah Allen estimated the average fuel consumption of the steam engines installed in Manchester in 1831 
as 13 lbs. About ten years later in 1842, Fairbairn considered this to be about 10.5 lbs, see Hunter (1985), p. 
600. In the same year Josiah Parkes considered 15 lbs to be more representative of the average coal 
consumption (Parkes, 1842, p. 67).  
16 This can be considered a reasonable estimate for the textile industries. In other industrial branches, engines 
normally worked slightly less, see von Tunzelmann (1978),  p. 73.    
17 The formula used is  pt∆ CH=∆ K, where pt is the threshold coal price, ∆ C the fuel saving (per HP-hour) 
brought about by the adoption of the high pressure engine, H the numbers of hours worked in the year, ∆ K 
the difference in capital cost per HP p.a.  
18 Von Tunzelmann (1974, p. 63) gives a price of 2s. 8d. for slack coal for a Staffordshire colliery in the period 
1828-36. Note that our calculation suggests that threshold price computed by von Tunzelmann for 1835 is 
probably overrated. The source of this over-estimation is in the estimated increase in capital costs resulting 
from the adoption of the Cornish high pressure boiler, which von Tunzelmann assumes to increase in direct 
proportion with heating surface (this amounts to multiply the price of the “corresponding” low pressure boiler 
by 7.5). Thus, for a 30 HP engine, he puts total boiler cost at £1500. Casual evidence seems to suggest that this 
errs far too much on the high side. In 1838 three boilers for a 60’’ engine for the Fresnillo Mine in Mexico were 
sold for £ 963 (Barton, 1965, p. 280). In 1841, James Sims offered, in an advertisement published on the West 
Briton, a 80’’ pumping engine for £2600, inclusive of boilers (Barton, 1965, p. 52). These figures are broadly 
consistent with the prices of table 7.1. In this respect, one has to take into account, as von Tunzelmann (1978, 
pp. 83-84) himself acknowledges, that in low coal price regions, steam engine manufacturers like Hick,  
generally avoided to construct the full-size Cornish boiler, opting for a “shortened” and cheaper version. The 
upshot of these considerations is that probably since the late 1820s-early 1830s  it would  have been economic 
profitable to install (locally adapted) versions of the high pressure engine even in low coal prices regions, 
vindicating Farey’s  allegations of some “technological complacency” in the behaviour of Lancashire 
entrepreneurs.    
  19These cases of early adoption did not amount to a slavish imitation of the Cornish practice. 
Lancashier engineers tried to “acclimatize” the engine to local circumstances and find a 
balance between gains in fuel efficiency and the higher capital costs involved in the use of 
high pressure (von Tunzelmann, p. 86). Accordingly,  the shift to high pressures was coupled  
with the  introduction of a number of adaptations/modifications, such as the 
“compounding” of existing engines with the addition of a high pressure cylinder (the so 
called ‘McNaughting’), the employment of smaller versions of Cornish boilers, etc.    
 
In our interpretation, the persistent technology gap between Cornwall and Lancashire in the 
first half of the nineteenth century is to be accounted for by the localized nature of 
technological knowledge. Put differently, different rates of technical progress in steam 
engineering ought to be related the cognitive dimensions of the inventive process.  
 
A particular insightful way to probe into this ground is to adopt Giovanni Dosi’s 
paradigm/trajectory approach (Dosi, 1982). Dosi defines a technological  paradigm as  
“‘model’ and a ‘pattern’ of solution of selected technological problems, based on selected 
principles derived from natural sciences and on selected material technologies” (Dosi, 1982, p. 
152, italics in the text). The term paradigm is borrowed from Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of 
science. In case of technologies, the concept of paradigm refers to a framework, jointly 
adhered by a significant group of innovators, guiding the search for technical advances in 
particular historical contexts,. In this way, a technological paradigm set the boundaries of the 
domain in which future technological developments will take place.  Dosi suggests  that it 
should be possible to “deconstruct” each technological paradigm into a set of “heuristics”. 
These represents the prevailing accepted rules prescribing the procedures to be adopted in 
the search for innovations (i.e., “in order to develop a more efficient engine, try to increase 
the rate of expansion”). 
 
It is interesting to note that the notions of technological paradigms and heuristics are 
intended to be broader in their scope than mere sets of engineering prescriptions. In Dosi’s 
view, technological heuristics are the product of the “amalgamation” of what might be 
termed the “autonomous drift” of a technology (i.e., the “compulsive sequences” of 
challenges and solutions individuated by Rosenberg (1976) which are insensitive to market 
signals) with “inducement factors” of a genuinely economic type (i.e., current and expected 
factor prices).  This means that local circumstances can, to a certain extent, shape the pattern 
of technological development. In our case, both the early  development of high pressure in 
Cornwall and the various attempts of upgrading the low pressure engine in Lancashire can 
be seen as a reflection of how the different economic needs of the various regions were 
incorporated in technical practices.  
 
The heuristic search process practised by the inventors’ community, by channelling inventive 
activities in specific and finalised directions, generates relatively ordered patterns of technical 
change, called “technological trajectories” , which, at least in principle, can be mapped in 
both the space of input of coefficients and that of product characteristics (Dosi, 1997, p. 
1533).  
 
The paradigm/trajectory view of technological evolution points to three essential features of 
the evolution of technologies:  
 
  20i) the  local nature of technical progress: inventive activities are paradigm-bounded 
and, for this reason, they are highly selective and focussed in rather precise 
directions. 
ii)  along a specific technological trajectory, technical advances are strongly 
cumulative, that is to say that they are strongly related to previous attainments.  
iii)  finally, technological development is likely to display strong irreversibility features. 
This means that techniques developed along particular trajectories are likely to 
become superior to “old”  ones for every factor prices configuration (as shown 
by our calculation of the threshold coal price). This means that once the 
movement along a particular technological trajectory has gained momentum, it 
becomes relatively irresponsive to change in input prices. Note, for example, that 
the rapid improvement in fuel efficiency of the Cornish engines continued 
despite coal prices in Cornwall are clearly characterized by a downward trend (see 
figure 3).       
  
To sum up, the basic argument put forward in this section is that the emergence of the two 
distinct  technological practices in British early nineteenth century steam engineering requires 
to take into account not only the economic needs of the various regions and of the 
application sectors, but also the processes of accumulation of technological knowledge. As 
we have shown, this implies the adoption of an interpretive framework capable of explicitly 
taking into account the “specificities” of the technology in  question 
 
Our suggested interpretation is that steam engineering practice in Britain during the early 
nineteenth century was characterized by the existence of two rival technological paradigms, 
the Cornish paradigm advocating high pressure used expansively and the Lancashire one, 
favouring low pressures (sanctioned by the authority of James Watt). Technological 
development within the high pressure paradigm, proceeded following two (to a limited 
extent) overlapping sets of heuristics (which over time consolidated themselves in two 
distinct design traditions): the first set of heuristics prescribing procedures for innovation in 
single cylinder pumping engines adopting the irregular Cornish power cycle and the second 
one concerning the compound engine and its application to manufacturing purposes. 
Technological opportunities determined a more rapid progress along the technological 
trajectory generated by the single cylinder set of heuristics, than along the compound mill 
engine one. Furthermore, many inventions matured along the single cylinder trajectory  
could not be readily transferred to the compound trajectory.   
 
All this leads us to consider the “entrepreneurial failure” of Lancashire entrepreneurs and 
their delay in shifting to high pressure steam in a rather different perspective. Clearly, the 
evidence presented above points to the technological conservatism of Lancashire 
industrialists. However, our interpretation stresses that the major stumbling block was 
represented by the lasting resilience of the low pressure paradigm in Lancashire.  Hence, one 
could also note that influential contemporary advocates of the high pressure expansive 
engine such as John Farey and William Fairbairn were by and large ineffective in their efforts 
of instigating in the Lancashire engineering community the “revolutionary climate” needed 
for the successful and “timely” subversion of the low pressure paradigm and, precisely for 
this reason, indulge in the temptation of laying a non minor part of the responsibility at their 
doors.  
 
  21As we have seen the adoption of the high pressure expansive engine in Lancashire mills  
required the introduction of a number of non trivial design modifications. In fact,  “sectoral”  
circumstances dictated to engineers different goals (fuel efficiency in Cornwall, speed and 
smoothness of motion in the manufacturing districts of the North, increases in the 
power/weight ratio for steam engine of locomotives, etc.), prompting the search for 
innovations in different directions.  Technological advances aimed at improving the 
effectiveness with which the steam engine could cater these specific sets of user 
requirements were indeed a leitmotiv of the development of steam power technology during 
the entire nineteenth century. The emergence of these application specific knowledge bases 
made difficult the transfer of innovations from one application to another. Due to the 
essentially idiosyncratic nature of these innovative activities, the evolution of the ‘engineering 
knowledge bases’ underpinning the various applications of the steam engine proceeded along 
rather differentiated trajectories. Accordingly, in each application domain, stable sets of  
engineering heuristics emerged from the combination of sector specific economic and 
technical circumstances with what might be called the more “general” internal logic of steam 
technology. This determined a highly uneven rate of technological advance among the 
various application domains. Using the David and Wright (1999) terminology, the dynamics 
of innovation rates across applications was not “yeast-like”, but “mushroom-like”.   
 
In fact, when the economic history of the steam engine is examined carefully, one can find a 
number of examples showing innovations matured in a particular application niche that 
could not be (successfully) transferred to the other application sectors.  
 
As already mentioned, according to Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2001) the widespread 
adoption of steam power in manufacturing was made possible by  the invention of the 
Corliss engine that permitted the delivery of  a continuous and steady rotary motion, even 
when faced with changes in the load. The engine was developed in the US by George Corliss 
in the period 1850s. Besides improving the regularity of the motion, Corliss’ inventions also 
greatly increased the efficiency of the steam engine, by making possible a better exploitation 
of the expansive power of steam. Interestingly enough, the Corliss valve gear, which was so 
successful in stationary practice, could not be applied  to locomotives. In 1851 Corliss tried 
to successfully enter in the manufacture of locomotive building the Advance a locomotive 
whose motive power was delivered by a Corliss engine. The design was far to complicated 
and proved to be a complete failure.
19 
                                                 
19 A contemporary witness recalled the experiment in these terms: “The locomotive was possessed of a certain 
inborn cussedness which could be hardly be the attribute of a mere machine – her spiritual nature was a sort of 
Mephistophelian cross with a Colorado mule  - and as to her physical constitution and membership a cotton 
factory ‘mule’ was simple in comparison. The Old Jigger had, as nearly as I can remember, 365 valves, one to 
break down every day in the year. And as a valve motion, well, nobody ever counted the number of its pieces. 
They were as the sands of the sea-shore. Most of them used to jar-off, the first few trips of the week, after 
which all men in the shop could comparatively keep track of the rest of them. I will say for the Old Jigger that 
she made the best indicator-card I saw from a locomotive; clean cut-off, almost a theoretical expansion curve, 
and an exhaust as if she had knocked out a cylinder head. Well, once in a while, after she had been jackassing 
over the road about four hours behind time, and we had pinch-barred her into the road-house, we used to pull 
out these indicator-cards of hers, and talk them over right before her, and we would look at her and ask one 
another why  in thunder an engine that could make a card like that would act as if the very old-chief engineer 
was in her. And next morning she would rouse up and pull the biggest rain that had ever  been over the road  - 
ahead of time” (Testimony of  Alexander Holley, one of the machinists of the Advance, cited in White (1997), p. 
202). 
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Similarly, the introduction of high pressure steam engine for ships involved the adoption of  
another  “localized” design. In this field, fuel economy was obviously of paramount 
importance. However, technical difficulties and strong attachment to low-pressure design 
prevented adoption of high-pressure steam, expansion and compounding until 1850s (Hills, 
1989, p.146).  The application of these principles began only after the basic principles of 
thermodynamics had been laid down, and hence the advantages of high-pressure steam were 
also understood correctly from a scientific point of view.
20 In the case of steam ships, and 
quite contrary to the case of the Cornish engine, compounding became the norm, and soon 
the average engine would expand the steam in three steps using as many cylinders.  
 
The opening up of compounding as a new trajectory for ship engines is to be ascribed to the 
engines designed by John Elder (who was a close associate of Rankine) in the early 1850s.  
Notably, Elder was probably one of the first to notice that compound engines were more 
efficient than single-cylinder engines at steam pressures exceeding those normally in vogue. 
Elder’s compound design became soon the favourite one for marine use. In the late 1850s 
and early 1860s, fuel efficiency of marine engines improved rapidly following a dynamics of 
rapid incremental change analogous to the one of Cornish pumping engines (Cardwell and 
Hills, 1976). Thus, while the compounding design was ‘locked out’ in Cornwall, where it was 
used at pressures that did not allow its full thermodynamic advantages, it ‘locked in’ in the 
case of marine engine building, where it was further developed and refined.  
 
Of course, these examples from the history of steam power are far from a complete 
overview of the developments in the field. However, we feel that they  provide a good 
illustration of the differences in the rates of technical progress across application sectors. In 
this respect, one could imagine that, after the 1850s, with the rise of scientific 
thermodynamics, some optimal and general design principles could be elaborated. However 
this was not the case. As noted by Gustave Adolphe Hirn, one of the leading pioneers of 
scientific thermodynamics, the formulation of a full fledged scientific theory of the steam 
engine had been of little help in actual steam engineering developments, precisely because 
sector specific functional requirements were already dictating too many features of the 
engine design (Cardwell, 1994, p. 314).  Curiously, although thermodynamics was developed 
as the “science of steam engine”, it exerted a much more powerful influence on different 
technological fields. This facet of the modern history of science was aptly remarked by J.D. 
Bernal:  
 
[A]lthough the laws of thermodynamics arose from consideration of the genesis of mechanical work – animal, 
chemical, electrical, and most of all from heat – it cannot be claimed that their formulation led to any 
immediate change in the practice of power production. Steam engines continued to be developed along lines 
indicating engineering improvements rather than any logical thinking out of the application of new 
principles......The one significant attempt at a Carnot cycle engine, Sir W. Siemens’ superheated steam 
regenerative engine of 1858, was not a success. Where such a financial and technical genius failed others were 
not likely to succeed. Even to this day there is only one heat engine, the Philips’air engine of 1942 that has been 
inspired by purely thermodynamic conceptions, and even that has not come into general use.      
The practical value of thermodynamics has been rather as a general guide to the design of the new internal 
combustion and turbine engines, whose basic mode of working was determined by mechanical possibilities. 
Where thermodynamics has been used most directly and successfully is in modern chemical engineering and in 
                                                 
20 Note, instead, that thermodynamics did not play any role in Corliss’ improvements. This suggests that, to 
some extent , sector specific knowledge bases relied on different sources of innovation. 
  23the reverse of the heat engine – refrigerating machinery and heat pumps – of which only the former came into 
use before the end of the century (Bernal, 1953, pp. 67-68).  
 
4      Concluding remarks 
 
Our reappraisal of the economic history of the steam engine was aimed at providing a critical 
evaluation of the interpretive power of GPT based growth models. As noted in the first 
section, the GPT view of economic growth is elaborated around three properties of 
technological revolutions namely,  their technological dynamism,  their pervasiveness and 
their capacity of inducing further innovations (technical and organizational) in the using 
sectors.  Although intuitively appealing, our discussion has shown that these concepts ought 
to be more rigorously defined, especially in view of empirical applications of the models.  
 
The case of the “age of steam” shows a technology that is surely pervasive, but it is 
characterized by uneven rates of technical advance across application sectors.  
This was due to the fact that in each application domain technical progress was dependent 
on distinct sectoral procedures of engineering knowledge accumulation.  
 
In an early speculative appraisal of the economic impact of information technologies, Keith 
Pavitt stressed the importance of taking properly into account “the differentiated and 
cumulative nature of technical change”  (Pavitt, 1986, p. 45). In particular, he noted that 
improvements in information technologies were going to be clearly affected by the existing 
technological trajectories.  Rather than “creative destruction”  the penetration of information 
technologies across application sectors was going to determine processes of “creative 
accumulation”  with information technologies being integrated into the existing “local”  
procedures of innovation.   
 
Endogenous growth models incorporating general purpose technologies (GPT) do not seem   
particularly well-equipped for taking into account the “local” aspect of the accumulation of 
technological knowledge. In this respect, we would contend instead that an evolutionary 
approach to modelling may be much more promising. We propose that such evolutionary 
modelling exercises should indeed focus on the salient features of the process of 
technological knowledge accumulation, rather than “black-boxing” it into knowledge 
product functions or similar analytical constructs. Silverberg (2002) has recently proposed 
the use of percolation models, and these may be able to provide a useful formalization of 
Dosi’s paradigm-trajectory approach, and are well suited to deal both with cases of very 
‘uneven’ technical advances and with cases in which technologies progress uniformly on a 
broad front.  
 
Our discussion has also revealed two other apparent shortcomings of GPT-growth models. 
First, these models are built around a simple deterministic scheme of invention and diffusion 
of a single technology with its ramifications. This does not appear to adequately capture 
some of the insights of the original neo-Schumpeterian perspective of radical technological 
breakthroughs and long waves. The original neo-Schumpeterian view emphasized the role of  
“constellations of major technical innovations” explicitly acknowledging the (mutual) 
interdependencies among major technological trajectories. Hence, this view is indeed very 
similar to the one sketched by Landes for the British industrial revolution. To a degree, each 
of these major trajectories is likely to be characterized by its own pace of advance. The 
  24amalgamation of this cluster of technological innovations with deep changes in the 
organization of production gives birth what might be called a new system of manufacturing 
(which is supposed to characterize a specific period of the economic history of capitalist 
economies).  Again, it is important to emphasize that the diffusion of the new system of 
manufacturing across sectors will exhibit a rather uneven character.   
 
The second limitation of the GPT-models concerns the microfoundations of the model. 
GPT-growth models retain the perfect-foresight equilibrium framework which is a common 
feature of all the neoclassical analysis of economic growth whose overall interpretive 
relevance has been criticized time and again (see Nelson, 1998 and Dosi and Fagiolo 1998 
for recent “statements” of this critique) . Moreover, the assumption of perfectly rational and 
perfectly informed agents, justified by the concern of neo-classical models with equilibrium, 
‘steady state’ outcomes only, implies a complete neglect of the ‘out-of-equilibrium dynamics’. 
However, this representation of technological change and of its relation to economic growth 
forcefully hides some of the crucial ‘dynamic’ properties of a process which is in continuous 
evolution and far from smooth in its diffusion. In a steady-state framework the closest proxy 
for history may be seen in specific ‘initial conditions’ that determine which steady state 
growth will be attained. But this is a quite an unsatisfactory way of inserting historical 
accounts in economic growth models (see Castaldi and Dosi (2003) and Hodgson (2001) for 
two recent discussions of the historical nature of economic evolution). Our discussion of the 
development of the high pressure expansive engine in various application sectors has shown 
(once more!) that technical change takes typically place in environments characterized by 
highly imperfect information and “strong” uncertainty. As we have seen, entrepreneurial 
failures were sweeping and  persistent features of the development to the high pressure 
engine in various application sectors.  Accordingly, notwithstanding their ambition of 
providing an interpretation of the historical pattern of economic growth, it is extremely 







Engels, F. (1845), The Condition of the Working Class in England (reprint Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
Farey, J. (1827), A Treatise on the Steam Engine, Historical, Practical and Descriptive (London; reprint Newton Abbot: 
David & Charles, 1971). 
Fairbairn, W (1849), “On the Expansive Action of Steam, and a New Construction of Expansion Valves for 
Condensing Steam Engines”, Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, vol 1, pp.20-34.  
Farey, J. (1971), A Treatise on the Steam Engine, Historical, Practical and Descriptive. Volume II (Newton Abbot: David 
& Charles). 
Lean (I), T. (1839), Historical Statement of the Improvements made in the Duty Performed by the Steam Engines in Cornwall  
(London). 
Palmer, G. H. (1838), “On the Application of Steam as a moving Power, considered especially with reference 
to the economy of Atmospheric and High Pressure Steam”, Transactions of the Institute of Civil Engineers, 
vol. 2, pp.33- 46.  
Parkes, J. (1842), “On Steam Boilers and Steam Engines”, Transactions of the Institution of Civil Engineers, vol. 3, pp. 
49-70.  
Pole, W. (1844), A Treatise on the Cornish Pumping Engine (London). 
Pole, W. (1862), “On the Double Cylinder Expansive Steam Engine”, Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers, vol. 15, pp. 242-288.  
  25Trestrail, N. (1896), “The Duty of Cornish Pumping Engines, Past and Present, and as Compared to Others”, 
Transactions of the Federated Institution of Mining Engineers, pp. 2-15. 
Wicksteed, T. (1836), “On the Effective Power of the High Pressure Expansive Condensing Steam Engines 
commonly in  use in Cornish Mines”, Transactions of the Institution of Civil Engineers, vol. 1, pp. 117-130.  
Wicksteed, T. (1838), “On the Effective Power of the High Pressure Expansive Condensing Engines in Use at 
some of the Cornish Mines”, Transactions of the Institution of Civil Engineer, vol. 2, pp. 61- 68. 





Allen, R.C. (1983), “Collective Invention”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 4, pp. 1-24. 
Ashton, T. S. (1948), The Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Barton, D. B. (1965), The Cornish Beam Engine (Truro: D. B. Barton).  
Bernal, J. D. (1953), Science and Industry in the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge & Kegan).   
Bresnahan T. and M. Trajtenberg (1995), “General Purpose Technologies: ‘Engines of Growth’ ?”, Journal of 
Econometrics, vol. 65, pp. 83-108.  
Bruland, K. and K. Smith (1999), “Large Scale Technological Transitions in History and Theory”, mimeo.  
Cardwell, D. S. L. (1994), The Fontana History of Technology (London: Harper).   
Castaldi, C. and G. Dosi (2003), The Grip of History and the Scope for Novelty: Some Results and Open 
Questions on Path Dependence in Economic Processes, in A. Wimmer and R. Koessler (eds.) Paradigms 
of Change (in press). 
Crafts, N. F. R. (1995), “Exogenous or Endogenous Growth ? The Industrial Revolution Reconsidered”, 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 55, pp. 745-773.  
Crafts, N. F. R. (2003), “Steam as a General Purpose Technology: A Growth Accounting Perspective”, London 
School of Economics, mimeo.  
David, P.A.(1975), Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).   
David, P.A. (1990), The Dynamo and the Computer: an Historical Perspective of the Modern Productivity 
Paradox, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 80, pp. 355-361. 
David, P. A. and G. Wright (1999), “Early Twentieth Century Productivity Growth Dynamics: an Inquiry into 
the Economic History of ‘Our Ignorance’”, University of Oxford, Discussion  Papers in Economic and 
Social History, n. 33.  
Dickinson, H. W and R. Jenkins (1927), James Watt and the Steam Engine (London: Encore, reprint 1981). 
Dosi, G. (1982), “Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories”, Research Policy, pp. 147-162.  
Dosi, G. (1997), “Opportunities, Incentives and the Collective Patterns of Technological Change”, Economic 
Journal, vol. 107, pp. 1530-1547.  
Dosi, G. and G. Fagiolo (1998), “Exploring the Unknown: On Entrepreneurship, Coordination and 
Innovation Driven Growth”  in J. Lesourne and A. Orlean (eds.), Advances in Self-Organisation and 
Evolutionary Economics (Paris: Economica). 
Feinstein, C. H. (1988), “National Statistics, 1760-1920” in C. H. Feinstein and S. Pollard (eds.), Studies in 
Capital Formation in the United Kingdom, 1750-1920 (Oxford: Clarendon).  
Foreman-Peck, J. (1991), “Railways and Late Victorian Economic Growth” in J.  Foreman-Peck (ed.), New 
Perspectives on the Victorian Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Freeman, C. and C. Perez (1988), “Structural Crises of Adjustment: Business Cycles and Investment 
Behaviour” in G.Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. Soete (eds.), Technical Change and 
Economic Theory (London: Pinter).  
Freeman, C. and F. Louca (2001), As Time Goes By. From the Industrial Revolution to the Information Revolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Hahn, F. H. and R.C.O. Matthews (1964), “The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey”, Economic Journal, vol. 
74, pp. 779-902.  
Hahn, F. H. (1988), “Neoclassical Growth Theory” in Eatwell, J., Milgate, M. and P. Newman (eds.), The New 
Palgrave: a Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan).  
Harberger, A. C. (1998), “A Vision of the Growth Process”, American Economic Review, vol. 88, pp. 1-32. 
Hawke, G. R. (1970), Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870 (Oxford:Clarendon). 
Helpman, E. (ed.) (1998), General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth ( Cambridge MA: Mit Press).    
Hills, R. (1989), Power from Steam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
  26Hodgson, G.M. (2001), How Economics Forgot History: the problem of historical specificity in social science (London: 
Routledge). 
Hunter, L. C. (1985), A History of Industrial Power in the United States, 1780-1930: Steam Power. (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia). 
Landes, D.S. (1969), The Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Lintsen, H.W. (1995), “Een Land met Stoom”in  Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland (Amsterdam: Walbur 
Pers). 
Kanefsky, J. W. (1979), The Diffusion of Power Technology in British Industry, 1760-1870 (University of Exeter, PhD 
Thesis).  
Kanefsky, J.W. and J. Robey (1980), “Steam Engines in 18th Century Britain: a Quantitative Assessment”, 
Technology and Culture, vol. 21, pp. 161-186. 
McCloskey, D. N and L. G. Sandberg (1971), “From Damnation to Redemption: Judgements on the Late 
Victorian Entrepreneur”, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 9, pp. 89-108.   
Maddison, A. (2001), The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD).  
Musson, A. E. (1978), The Growth of British Industry (London: Batsford).  
Nelson, R.R. (1981), “Research on Productivity Growth and Productivity Differentials: Dead Ends and New 
Departures”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 19, pp. 1029-64. 
Nelson, R.R.(1998), “The Agenda for Growth Theory: a Different Point of View”, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol 22, pp. 497-520.  
Nuvolari, A. (2004), “Collective Invention during the British Industrial Revolution: The Case of the Cornish 
Pumping Engine”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
Nuvolari, A. and B. Verspagen (2003), “ ‘Unraveling the Duty’: Lean’s Engine Reporter and the Development of 
the Cornish Steam Engine”, paper presented at the 2003 Annual Conference of the Economic History 
Society, Durham 4-6 April, 2003.  
Pavitt, K. (1986), “ ‘Chips’  and ‘Trajectories’: How Does the Semiconductor Influence the Sources and 
Directions of Technical Change ?” in MacLeod, R.M. (ed.), Technology and the Human Prospect 
(London:Pinter).  
Rosenberg, N. (1976), Perspectives on Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Rosenberg, N. and C. Frischtak (1984), “Technological Innovation and Long Waves”, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol. 7, pp 45-60.  
Rosenberg, N. and M. Trajtenberg (2001), “A General Purpose Technology at Work: the Corliss Steam Engine 
in the late 19th Century US”, NBER Working paper n. 8485.  
Samuel, R. (1977), “Workshop of the World: Steam Power and Hand Technology in mid-Victorian Britain”, 
History Workshop, vol. 3, pp. 5-72.  
Silverberg, G. (2002), “The Discrete Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Quantum and Continuous Perspectives on 
Innovation and Growth”, Research Policy, vol. 31, pp. 1275-1289.  
Verspagen B. (2002), “Structural Change and Technology: A Long View”, paper presented at the Conference 
“The Empirical Implications of Technology-Based Growth Theories”, Groningen  26-27 August 2002.  
Vincenti, W. G. (1990), What Engineers Know and How They Know It. Analytical Studies from Aeronautical History 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press).  
Von Tunzelmann, G. N. (1974), Some Economic Aspects of the Diffusion of Steam Power in the British Isles to 1856, with 
special reference to the Textile Industries, (Oxford: DPhil thesis).   
Von Tunzelmann, G. N. (1978), Steam Power and British Industrialization to 1860 (Oxford: Clarendon).  
White, J. H. (1997), American Locomotives: An Engineering History 1830-1880 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 












  27                       
 








03.01 A.  Nuvolari 
Open source software development: some historical perspectives 
 
03.02 M.  van  Dijk 
Industry Evolution in Developing Countries: the Indonesian Pulp and Paper Industry 
 
03.03 A.S.  Lim 
Inter-firm Alliances during Pre-standardization in ICT 
 
03.04  M.C.J. Caniëls & H.A. Romijn 
What drives innovativeness in industrial clusters?Transcending the debate 
 
03.05  J. Ulijn, G. Duysters, R. Schaetzlein & S. Remer 
Culture and its perception in strategic alliances, does it affect the performance? An exploratory study 
into Dutch-German ventures 
 
03.06  G. Silverberg & B. Verspagen 
Brewing the future: stylized facts about innovation and their confrontation with a percolation model 
 
03.07  M.C. Caniëls, H.A. Romijn & M. de Ruijter-De Wildt 
Can Business Development Services practitioners learn from theories on innovation and services 
marketing?   
 
03.08  J.E. van Aken 
On the design of design processes in architecture and engineering: technological rules and the principle 
of minimal specification 
 
03.09 J.P.  Vos 
Observing Suppliers observing Early Supplier Involvement: An Empirical Research based upon the 
Social Systems Theory of Niklas Luhmann 
 
03.10 J.P.  Vos 
Making Sense of Strategy: A Social Systems Perspective 
 
03.11  J.A. Keizer & J.P. Vos 
Diagnosing risks in new product development 
 
03.12  J.M. Ulijn , A. Fayolle & A. Groen 
European educational diversity in technology entrepreneurship: A dialogue about a culture or a 
knowledge management class? 
 03.13 J.M.  Ulijn,  S.A. Robertson, M. O’Duill 
Teaching business plan negotiation: How to foster entrepreneurship with engineering students 
 
03.14  J.E. van Aken 
The Field-tested and Grounded Technological Rule as Product of Mode 2 Management Research  
 
03.15  K. Frenken & A. Nuvolari 
The Early Development of the Steam Engine: An Evolutionary Interpretation using Complexity Theory  
 
03.16  W. Vanhaverbeke, H. Berends, R. Kirschbaum & W. de Brabander  
Knowledge management challenges in corporate venturing and technological capability building 
through radical innovations 
 
03.17  W. Vanhaverbeke & R. Kirschbaum   
Building new competencies  for new business creation based on  breakthrough technological innovations 
 
03.18  K.H. Heimeriks & G.M. Duysters   
Alliance capability as mediator between experience and alliance performance: an empirical investigation 
into the alliance capability development process 
 
03.19  G.M. Duysters & K.H. Heimeriks  
Developing Alliance Capabilities in a New Era  
 
03.20  G.M. Duysters, K.H. Heimeriks, J. Jurriëns 
Three Levels of Alliance Management 
 
03.21  B. Verspagen & C. Werker 
The invisible college of the economics of innovation and technological change 
 
03.22  W. Vanhaverbeke, B. Beerkens, and G. Duysters 
Explorative and exploitative learning strategies in technology-based alliance networks 
 
03.23  S.J. van Dijk, G.M. Duysters & A.J.M. Beulens  
Transparency dilemmas, information technology and alliances in agriculture and food industry 
 
03.24  S.J. van Dijk & M.P.C.D. Weggeman  
Knowledge sharing in technology alliances 
 
03.25  C. Castaldi & A. Nuvolari  
Technological Revolutions and Economic Growth:The “Age of Steam” Reconsidered 